On the effects of entry by SEADE, Jesús
Lingnan University
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Staff Publications - Department of Economics Department of Economics
3-1980
On the effects of entry
Jesús SEADE
University of Warwick, seade@ln.edu.hk
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_sw
Part of the Econometrics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Staff Publications - Department of Economics by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.
Recommended Citation
Seade, J. (1980). On the effects of entry. Econometrica, 48(2), 479-489. doi: 10.2307/1911111
Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 2 (March, 1980) 
ON THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY 
BY JESUS SEADE' 
The effects of entry into an oligopolistic industry are studied, generalizing the usual 
Cournot model to allow for the possibility of collusion by firms and deriving stronger 
results than had previously been obtained. Necessary and sufficient conditions for output 
per firm y to rise or fall as entry occurs are given and discussed, and the "perverse" effect 
(entry increasing y) is shown to be consistent with stable equilibria and not empirically 
implausible. In contrast, it is shown that industry output unambiguously expands and 
profits per firm fall as entry into stable equilibria takes place. Total industry profits are also 
considered and some results obtained. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE PROBLEM OF ENTRY receives a great deal of attention in present-day 
Industrial Economics. The main question typically asked in this connection, ever 
since the work of Bain and Sylos-Labini, is what the best strategies are for 
oligopolists facing the threat of entry into their industry, that is, the implications of 
potential entry on their optimal policies regarding pricing, investment, research 
and development, advertising, and so on. Were entry to occur, conventional 
wisdom says, the effects would be unambiguous: profits per firm, and perhaps also 
output per firm would fall, while the industry as a whole would become "more 
competitive" in some sense, in particular expanding output. These effects are 
commonly taken for granted in discussions on entry, as obvious truths or, at best, 
as underlying assumptions. The natural question arises of whether this deep- 
rooted piece of conventional wisdom is in fact correct for the general case, as the 
behavior of oligopoloy is, alas, complex enough to keep many surprises in store. 
Of course, these remarks are not meant to apply to the limit case where barriers 
to entry are removed altogether, thus breaking entirely the oligopolistic set-up. 
The effect on profits, in particular, would in this extreme case be necessarily 
unambiguous, as they would need to be zero in the new equilibrium, be it perfect 
or monopolistic competition. This is no more than a definition of equilibrium, but 
perhaps our intuition draws too heavily on this trivial consideration 2 
Some of the effects of entry we shall be examining, in particular those on output, 
have been studied before, albeit in a rather limited form. Frank [1], Okuguchi [3], 
and Ruffin [4] found that certain "reasonable" conditions were sufficient for 
aggregate output to rise and firm-output to fall as entry occurs in the simple 
Cournot model of oligopoly.3 However, these authors do not examine what 
1 I should like to thank Keith Cowling, Avinash Dixit, Paul Stoneman, a referee of this journal, and 
participants at the 1977 Warwick Summer Economics Workshop (on Oligopoly) for helpful com- 
ments. 
2 Even then, however, the limit behavior of output and price is not obvious [1, 4]. 
3 Otherwise, [1] and [4] mainly discuss limit behavior as unrestricted entry is introduced. Other 
contributions are by McManus [2], who derives similar results diagrammatically, assuming linear 
demands and costs; Telser [6], who wrongly derives a result on aggregate output (p. 136); and 
Okuguchi [3], who extends the results of [1, 4] on limited entry to the case where industry hetero- 
geneity of a special form is allowed (see fn. 5, below). All these authors consider only the Cournot 
model. 
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happens when these nontrivial requirements are not imposed, nor do they look 
into the behavior of other related variables. We shall see, for example, that much 
stronger sufficient conditions for "normal" behavior of aggregate output can be 
given than those they assume-in fact we shall find that output always expands 
with entry, given only observability of equilibrium, but we shall argue too that it is 
not quite safe to disregard the cases they exclude. 
Our aim here is to look at the effects of entry systematically, (i) discussing 
movements in profits as well as in outputs, at the firm and industry levels; (ii) 
allowing the conditions for alternative comparative-statics forms of behavior to 
emerge from the analysis, with no a priori requirement other than profit maxi- 
mization, and (iii) relaxing the strong Cournot assumption into a somewhat more 
general "quasi-Cournot" world, where firms may have a certain degree of 
"collusion," that is, awareness of their interdependence via the equilibrium effects 
of their individual actions, provided these effects are well defined and well 
predicted by producers. We shall identify certain demand (and cost) conditions 
under which entry (or exit) would cause the equilibrium values of some of the 
variables studied to move in the opposite direction to conventional wisdom. Some 
such "perverse" effects of entry, however, will be ruled out on the grounds that 
they correspond to unstable (hence in practice unobservable) equilibria identified 
in [5], while others remain real possibilities previously ignored by assumption. 
2. FRAMEWORK 
Let homogeneous output Y be produced by n firms, producing yf each, with 
price p determined by the inverse demand function p = p ( Y). Profits for a firm are 
-if = yfp (y) - cf(yf), 
where c(f * ) is the cost function. Profit maximization requires 
dllf fdY I 
dyf= dy - Cf = 
for all f, where dY/dyf is the conjectural change in total output Y for firm f, 
relative to a given small change in its own output yf. This conjectural change can 
take on any value in general, which renders the whole exercise in principle 
indeterminate. It is this game-theoretic indeterminateness of the conjectural 
variations that make oligopoly theory difficult to handle. 
In order to make things manageable, I shall assume each firm conjectures others 
would follow, perhaps only partially, its own expansions or contractions of output 
around a given joint optimum, a reflection of their common desire to protect their 
market shares, in such a way that the value of dY/dyf is some factor Af which 
would probably be taken by the firm to be, and shall be treated here as a constant 
in the relevant ranges. Nothing crucial hinges on this assumed constancy of A f, and 
we shall later allow this parameter to vary as entry occurs. What matters is the 
assumed existence of the function dY/dyf, i.e. that each firm be able to predict 
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correctly the effects of its actions on the industry. This way of modelling inter- 
actions within an industry is a convenient standard practice which might naturally 
be called "quasi-Cournot" behavior. An extreme instance of it is the Cournot 
assumption, by which each firm conjectures the rest of the industry would not 
follow it at all were it to expand its own output, hence dY/dyf = 1 then. At the 
other end, if all firms were fully aware of their interactions, any "profitable" move 
by a given firm would be exactly matched by similar measures by the rest, all of 
them reacting to the same environment. We would then get, in an industry of 
equal-sized firms, dY/dyf = n. This is tantamount to having full collusion of all 
firms concerned, as if they had an explicit monopolistic agreement to choose the 
level of aggregate output that maximizes joint profits, subject only to the 
condition that these profits be equally generated and distributed amongst them. 
This provides an intuitively plausible upper bound on the change in Y that would 
follow a firm's changing its own output. In sum, we shall treat the reaction factor 
At as a constant, whose interesting values probably lie between 1 and n.4 The 
larger A is, the more "collusive" the behavior it captures. 
Finally, we shall assume, for great convenience and at low cost in terms of 
interpretation, that firms are identical and equilibria symmetric. The reason for 
doing this is that, with a non-homogeneous industry, it is not clear anymore what 
"entry" means, as it becomes necessary to specify the kind of firm that enters the 
industry. This would complicate notation and expressions considerably and 
weaken possible results, while providing no interesting new insight into the 
problem.5 Thus, eliminating differences across firms, first and second order 
conditions for an equilibrium become 
(1) p + Ayp'-c'= O, 
and 
(2) A2yp" +2Ap'-c"<O. 
For convenience, I use strict concavity of profits as a function of own-output 
(hence (2) at the equilibrium point), which with (1) is sufficient for an equilibrium, 
instead of the customary necessary condition, with a weak inequality in (2). 
4 These bounds on possible forms of industry behavior, between Cournot and full collusion, are only 
suggested to fix ideas, and assumed in the paper for convenience. One might perhaps want to allow for 
A 's in [0, 1), a regime of "struggle," rather than "collusion" as in (1, n]. The story would go that, were I 
to reduce my output trying to move up along my perceived demand curve, others would jump in, 
expanding output and taking part of my market share. Or one might even argue for lower values of A 
for reductions than for increases in yf, a general kinked-demand-curve-type phenomenon. 
5 An alternative way to circumvent these difficulties is used by Okuguchi [3], who allows for 
differences across firms but requires entry to be in effect replication of the industry, so that the whole 
range of existing firms "enter," in the given prevailing proportions. This seems a natural tack for 
discussions of limit cases, as in the well-known analogue of this replication in the context of general 
equilibrium and the core. But as an assumption on the nature of (limited) entry it seems somewhat 
artificial. 
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3. MODELLING ENTRY 
Let us now let a new producer enter (or leave) the industry. It would be of great 
help to be able to treat the number of firms n as a continuous variable and 
differentiate all relevant variables with respect to it. This in fact is common 
practice, usually with an apology rather than a justification. But this expedient can 
easily be made rigorous. We simply allow the number of firms n to be an actual 
continuous variable on which everything depends differentiably according to the 
given relations, but we restrict attention to integer realizations of this variable. 
Then, if 6 is any dependent variable defined on the number of firms n, its change 
when one firm enters is Ae = In,, 6'(v) dv. It is clear that (sign Ae) = (sign 6'(v)) 
whenever the latter sign does not change in the relevant range (n, n + 1); other- 
wise the sign of Ae is ambiguous. I shall assume away cases where this ambiguity 
arises and hence work with sign 6'(n) directly. It is essentially this single-signed- 
ness assumption, which one can check, that underlies the common continuous 
treatment of discrete variables in problems of the present sort. 
4. OUTPUT PER FIRM 
The "normal," or conventional-wisdom result whose robustness we want to 
examine is that output per firm declines as entry occurs: dy/dn < 0. Differentiat- 
ing (1) with respect to n, 
pI dyy +yP nd +y A,dy =c,,dy P ( dn Y YP(dn dn dn 
which, assuming p' < 0, yields 
(3) (E+m)/(E+m +k) 
(if E + m + k : 0), where iq,n (n dy/dn)/y is the elasticity of y with respect to n, 
whose sign interests us, and 
m-n/A; 
E-Yp"/p'; and 
k 1 -c"/Ap'. 
The use of these variables will considerably simplify our notation and be an aid to 
intuition. It will be seen that, in fact, m and E are the key explanatory variables in 
most of what follows. The former, m -n/A, can be regarded as the number of 
"effective" firms in the industry, i.e. the inverse of a measure of effective concen- 
tration quite distinct from the standard measure of observed concentration n, 
which is here adjusted by the degree of collusion A.6 When A = 1 (no collusion, the 
Cournot case), the market has n "effective" (and actual) firms, whereas when 
A = n, the market behaves in a fully collusive manner, with m = 1 (as a monopolist, 
6 The unequal-firms counterpart of this m would be 1/HA, where H - w2 is the Herfindahl index 
of observed concentration, the wi's being the market shares of individual firms. 
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subject only to symmetry).7 To avoid unnecessary taxonomy of results, I shall 
assume 1 < m < n throughout. 
Apart from m, which in the Cournot model reduces to n and has no special 
interest in itself, the central variable to examine turns out to be E Yp"/p', the 
elasticity of the slope of demand, negative (positive) for convex (concave) curves. 
This will be discussed in some detail in the following section. 
Finally, the variable k 1 - c"/Ap' will usually have a value not far from 1 and at 
any rate will normally be positive, since k<0 is equivalent to c"<Ap', i.e. 
marginal costs not only falling but doing so faster than perceived demand, a rather 
uninteresting possibility which we shall in fact presently rule out altogether. 
With this notation, we can rewrite the second-order condition (2) as 
(4) E+m+mk>O. 
On the other hand, it is shown in [5] that (i) given k > 0, as one would normally 
assume, equilibrium is unstable (a saddle point) for E < - (m + k) and stable for 
E > - (m + k), which includes in particular the case assumed in [1, 3, 4], E > -m ;8 
and that (ii) k < 0 by itself yields instability. It is natural to disregard unstable 
equilibria as being unobservable, in particular in the context of a comparative- 
statics exercise, where any possible initial unstable equilibrium would be lost 
when perturbed and would not be regained subsequently. We therefore impose 
(5) k>0, 
and more importantly 
(6) E + m + k > O, 
which given (5) is a stronger requirement than (4). These conditions are necessary 
and sufficient for stability of the present model (under industry homogeneity; [5]); 
if either of them is reversed the equilibrium turns into a saddle point, of a different 
kind for each of the two cases, while not both conditions can fail to hold at the 
same time in any (stable or unstable) equilibrium, by (4), given m ~ 1. 
Most results we shall derive below will be instances of Samuelson's cor- 
respondence principle, depending critically on these stability conditions. But the 
first result follows directly: 
RESULT R1 (Ruffin): E > - m is sufficient for iryn < 0. 
PROOF: Given E + m > 0, E + m + k - 0 implies k < 0, which in turn implies 
E + m + mk - 0 given m : 1, thus contradicting (4). It follows that (6) must hold 
and, by (3), that rlyn < 0. Q.E.D. 
7 Similarly, when A = 0 (cf. note 4) the number of effective firms is m = oo, just as in perfect 
competition. Here, no individual firm can change aggregate output (hence price), because of the 
voracious practices of its competitors. 
8Assumptions A', B1', and B2' in [5] are equivalent to k>O, E>-m, and E<-(m+k), 
respectively. 
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The next result gives the sign of dy/dn (= sign 71yn) for the general case. 
RESULT R2: Output per firm behaves in a "perverse" form as entry occurs 
(7yn > 0), given only stability of equilibrium, if and only if - (m + k) <E < -m; 
otherwise, 77yn < 0 (with strict inequality for E > -m). 
"Otherwise" here, given only the second-order condition (4), would in prin- 
ciple mean E's in either of two disjoint intervals, - (m + mk) < E < - (m + k) or 
-m < E, which would be surprising, but the first of these possibilities is excluded 
by (6). 
5. INTERPRETATION 
The elasticity of the slope of demand E Yp"/p', is (inversely) related to the 
curvature of p = p ( Y), taking its sign from whether the latter is concave or convex. 
When E is negative and large, e.g. E < -m, or more so E < - (m + k), the slope is 
falling in absolute value "too" quickly, i.e. we have a "very" convex curve. Let us 
see what ruling out either of these possibilities means, as one needs to do to ensure 
"normal" behavior in R2 or at least stability (equation (6)), respectively. 
The condition E > -m can be transformed into 
(7) 2Ap'+A 2ypIt< Ap'. 
Now, each firm conjectures that dY/dy = A and so Y = Ay + Q (for some 
constants A, Q), locally. Hence perceived demand for the firm, relating price to its 
own output, can be written as p = p (Ay + Q) D(y; A, Q), which as a function of y 
has slope Ap' and whose marginal revenue curve is p +Ayp'. The slope of the 
latter, finally, is 2Ap'+Ak2yp". Hence (7) (and so E> -m) requires marginal 
revenue to be steeper than perceived demand, which in the Cournot case reduces 
simply to market demand. 
The relation between these relative slopes and the interpretation of E in terms 
of the curvature of demand is easily shown diagrammatically. In Figure 1 
perceived demand D meets the price axis at po and becomes perfectly elastic at 
p1. Clearly, MR < D whenever Dy (i.e. Ap') < O, while MR = D both when D is 
flat and at po. It obviously follows that MR must be flatter than D for some values 
of y, say at y0, before merging with D at y 1. Hence an equilibrium at y0 does not 
satisfy E > -m. 
Yet another interpretation of the condition E> -m is helpful. We know 
marginal revenue for the producer is given by MR = p + Ayp', where the argument 
of p( ) is Ay + Q. Let us now perform the thought exercise of increasing everyone 
else's output while keeping "our" producer's output y constant, hence increasing 
total output Y = Ay + Q via Q alone. From the expression for MR we get that 
MR0 = p'+ Ayp", which is negative if and only if (7) holds. That is, the sufficient 
condition for "normality" of results E > -m, can be re-read as saying that 
MR0 < 0, that MR for a firm should fall as other firms expand output. Viewed in 
this light, the perverse result in R2 is not so surprising: suppose a new firm enters 
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FIGURE 1 
an industry producing initially the same output the typical firm was producing 
before entry. This extra output increases Q ("output by all others") for each of the 
previous firms. But if E < -m, this expansion by others inzcreases MR for each 
individual firm, which obviously induces all previously established firms to 
expand. 
A similar interpretation (see [5]) can be shown to apply to the bottom boundary 
of the "perverse" interval in R2, where (6) stops holding and instability starts. 
E > - (m + k) requires the producer's perceived profits function to be "concave 
enough," so that a "forced" increase in output away from equilibrium by all firms 
renders each firm's own perceived marginal profit negative (it was zero in 
equilibrium), thus inviting them to pull back to equilibrium, despite the positive 
effect on marginal revenue of the others' expansion when E < -m, as explained 
above. 
A simple example as shown in Table I will suggest that perverse possibilities 
should generally not be ruled out a priori. Suppose demand has constant elasticity 
TABLE I 
PRICE ELASTICITIES FOR THE FLOOR ON SECOND ORDER CONDITIONS 
(LINE 2) AND FOR THE "PERVERSE" INTERVAL IN R2 TO APPLY (LINES 3, 
4). 
m 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 5 
1/(2m-1) 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/9 
1/m 1 2/3 1/2 2/5 1/3 1/5 
1/(m -1) co 2 1 2/3 1/2 1/4 
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8, p= A Y1/, and that c" = 0. In this case E Yp"/p' is also a constant: 
E = - ((1/e) + 1). Hence, the second order condition reads e > 1/(2m - 1), while 
the critical interval for E indicated in R2 corresponds to 1/rm < < 1/(m - 1); the 
lower of these limits is also the lower boundary for equilibria to be stable. 
Remember that the number of effective firms m = n/A will usually be lower, 
perhaps considerably so, than n, the crude number of oligopolists in the given 
industry. 
For values of m beyond 4 or 5, say, one can be fairly confident that conventional 
wisdom is correct, but for m close to 1 practically every value of e consistent with 
stable equilibria yields dy/dn > 0. The example is not special on this, and entry of 
a new producer into a highly collusive or otherwise concentrated quasi-Cournot 
industry may rather easily result in increased output perfirm! The explanation for 
this seemingly surprising result lies on the relatively serious blow that entry 
represents to existing firms' monopoly power when this power is high. This result 
or possibility will be reinforced if the collusion parameter A itself falls as entry 
occurs, as one would expect it to do; this will be shown in the closing section. 
6. AGGREGATE OUTPUT AND PROFITS PER FIRM 
Conventional wisdom suggests dHf/dn < 0 and dY/dn > 0. From Y = ny, we 
immediately get T)Yn = 1 + Thn. Hence, from (3), 
(8) 77yn = k/(E + m + k). 
It is clear that k > 0 and (E + m) > 0 are sufficient for qyn > 0; this, for the 
Cournot case, is the main result on limited entry of Frank [1], Okuguchi [3] (whose 
model is however more general in a different respect; see footnote 5) and Ruffin 
[4]. We have just argued that the second of these assumptions is not a good one to 
impose a priori, unlike the first one which is economically harmless and mathema- 
tically required for stability. But (8) tells us directly the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for "quasi-competitiveness" of equilibrium, iy,n > 0, which turn out to 
be precisely the same as those for stability, equations (5) and (6).9 
RESULT R3: Total output always expands as entry into stable equilibria 
occurs. 
Similarly, differentiating Ilf = yp (ny) - c (y) we obtain, after some manipula- 
tions, 
dHf y p [E+m+mk] 
dn m E+m+k 
which from p'<0, second-order (4), and stability (6), gives again a definite 
answer. 
RESULT R4: Profits per firm always fall as entry into stable equilibria occurs. 
9 Given that the numerator and denominator in (8) cannot both be negative, by (4). 
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I found these results stronger than I expected, as they apply to the general 
Cournot case and more, without any special conditions. 
7. TOTAL PROFITS 
The effect of entry on profits is less clear-cut than those on the variables we have 
discussed so far. This is what one would expect, however, as levels previously 
irrelevant, notably the fixed cost c (0) which the entrant incurs, are now important. 
Some special cases can be considered, an interesting one being that when profits 
are negative before entry occurs (a short-run possibility, provided only running 
profits remain positive), with "entry" being no'w interpreted as of negative sign 
presumably, i.e. exit. For this case, since 
(10) dillT d(nll') dlHl 
dn dn dn 
we immediately get (using R4): 
RESULT R5: Hf 0 is sufficient for dHT/dn <0, given only stability of 
equilibria. 
Hence "exit" from an ailing industry is always beneficial not only to the firms 
that remain (R4) but also to the industry as a whole. But, of course, if Hf > 0, the 
positive profits made by the entrant may compensate for the reduction in profits 
other firms will suffer, rendering the sign of dHfT/dn indeterminate. This is made 
clearer by the following alternative form of (10) (derived, e.g., using (9)): 
dHT (n-A)y2p'k (c) 
dn E+m+k 
The first term in (11) depends essentially on demand conditions, and can be 
thought of as representing the change, following entry, in the extent to which 
consumer's surplus is captured by producers. The second term, on the contrary, is 
purely related to cost conditions, and corresponds to the extent to which 
producers are collective cost minimizers for given total output: as entry occurs, 
total costs fall by yc', the total marginal cost saved by established firms as they 
reduce output by y units altogether, minus c, the total cost of production incurred 
by the new firm. Clearly, the two terms in (11) are rather independent of each 
other and the second one can take any sign. 
Let us note two further special cases from (11). 
(i) Underfull collusion, totalprofits increase (fall) with entry if average costfor the 
firm is an increasing (decreasing) function of output: c' < cdy. The reason is clear: 
under increasing costs, the total cost curve for the group is lowered by entry, as a 
more efficient scale is used per plant, while Y is simply adjusted collectively (in a 
fully collusive manner) so as to remain maximizing total profits. But this shows 
how easily one can have dHT/dn > 0, merely by having increasing costs and a high 
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degree of collusion in the industry, say, a pair of not too unlikely conditions. 
(ii) Decreasing-(or nonincreasing-) costs industries necessarily have their total 
profits lowered by entry. 
8. A VARIABLE DEGREE OF COLLUSION 
The conjectural variation A has been assumed not only to be (well defined and) 
constant at and around a given equilibrium but, what is probably more debatable, 
it has been treated as a constant across equilibria, as entry takes place. It might be 
argued, however, that A does depend on the number of firms n, as the greater ease 
of communication amongst firms or of enforcement of (explicit or tacit) 
agreements when they are few may facilitate more collusive policies to be 
pursued. This could have easily been incorporated in the above analysis at great 
expense in terms of simplicity of the expressions obtained. However, we do not 
need full details of these new equations to obtain qualitative results. Writing 
6 = 6(n, A) for any of the variables considered above, we have de/dn = 
(at/an) + (a/3A)(dA/dn), so that we need only look at ae/aA here, and briefly 
bring this effect together with the at/an of previous sections. Proceedings as 
before, one easily finds: 
(12) =-1(E+m +k), 
and 
(13) dHI/dA = -y2p'(m -1)/(E + m + k). 
Also, qyk = qyk and dHT/dA = ndHf/dA. Hence, imposing (E + m + k) > 0, the 
effect of increased collusion, by itself, turns out to be unambiguous in all cases: y 
and Y fall, while Hf and HT rise with A. Collusion works. And if dA/dn < 0, as one 
would presumably assume, the total effect of entry on Hf and Y remains 
"normal" always, reinforcing R3 and R4, while the ambiguous effects on y and HIT 
remain of course ambiguous, but the possibility of perverse movements in the 
former is increased when collusion is less after entry takes place, while for 
aggregate profits a "normal" behavior, if falling profits is what one expects, 
becomes more likely through this effect. 
University of Warwick 
Manuscript received August, 1978; revision received March 1979. 
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